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this will break many features/tools of current routing nodes
how do these weigh against the risk |
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Currently, on the node hardening aspect, both remote signing and the ability to set, on channel creation, an address for coop close, cover a significant part of node hardening against malicious attacks; this leaves out the possibility, for an attacker who has direct access to the node, to just use the existing local balance of already opened channels, to send payments to themselves until said channels are completely drained.
For a "routing-only" node, an operation mode that will literally only allow routing (that is, no other payments than those starting from, and ending to, an owned channel's local balance, otherwise known as circular rebalances) would further strengthen the security against direct attacks.
On the other hand, this would also prevent loop out and submarine swaps, or similar arrangements, but a sufficiently motivated operator would still appreciate the security improvements, and could setup a private channel with a separate wallet, from where to allow for such swaps if needed.
Also, this would leave out another possible attack vector, where the malicious actor could implement a "fee theft" attack, forcing rebalances to go through their own node, collecting artificially high fees.
This could be covered implementing an additional feature to "routing only" mode.
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