Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
101 lines (86 loc) · 5.68 KB

MAINTAINERS_THREAT_MODEL.md

File metadata and controls

101 lines (86 loc) · 5.68 KB

Node.js maintainers: Threat Model

This document serves as a comprehensive overview of access levels for specific resources related to the Node.js project. The purpose is to provide clarity on who has access to each resource, the extent of that access, and any notable distinctions within groups or subgroups. By documenting these access controls, we aim to promote transparency, accountability, and better resource management.

Note

This document is still under development.

Access per Group

The Access per Group table below outlines the permissions granted to different teams and individuals, categorized by resource and access level. The levels are inspired by standard UNIX permission notations, defined as follows:

  • -: No access
  • r: Read-only access
  • w: Write access
  • a: Admin/Owner access

Additional notes:

  • While some teams can have access to a resource, like the secrets, they might have different access level internally based on sub-groups.
  • Some individuals and team have access such write in different GitHub repositories in the org, like Working groups or subteams.

Note

¹ - All repositories with code that get published or has some impact on nodejs/core ² - Releasers has access to run CI during CI Embargo (Security Release)

Resource External people Contributors - Core/Triagers/WG Build - Test/Infra/Admin Admin - TSC/Releasers/Moderation Security Stewards/Triagers/External GitHub - Actions/Plugins
HackerOne - --- --- aw- www --
MITRE - --- --- a-- w-- --
private/node-private - --- www aw- w-w --
private/security-release - --- --- a-- ww- --
private/secrets - --- www a-- --- --
nodejs/node r wrr rrw awa rrr wr
nodejs/deps¹ r rrr rrw arr rrr wr
nodejs/build (GH) r rrr rrw awa rrr wr
nodejs/node-core-utils r rrr rrw awa rrr wr
npm account - - -a- a-- --- --
Jenkins CI - test r ww- wwa -w²- --- ww
Jenkins CI - release - --- -ww -w- --- --
Infra - test - w-- aaa ww- -w- ww
Infra - release - --- -ww -w- --- --
Build infra - --- -a- --- --- --
Website Infra - --- -a- a-- --- --
Youtube - --w --- a-- --- --
Zoom r rrw --- a-- --- --
1Password - --r --- a-- --- --
Social media accounts - --- --- --- --- --
Email (nodejs-sec) r rrr rrr awr wrr rr
Email (io.js aliases) r --- -a- w-- --- --

Repos under nodejs which do not include code, are not covered as they cannot lead to the threats listed. pkgjs.org is excluded as it does not include code/repos that make it into Node.js binaries

Threats

Malicious code in Node.js codebase

In this scenario we asume that a malicios actor will include a malicious code (malware, malicious dependencies, polluted binaries...) in the codebase (GitHub repository)

Vectors:

  • Use priviledge access to GitHub in order to add/modify/pollute the Git History
  • Pollute a dependency that is used by the project directly (v8, livub, openSSL, undici...) or inderictly (builds process/testing)

Related CWEs:

Resource Minimum Access Description
HackerOne - N\A
MITRE - N\A
private/node-private Write -
private/security-release - N\A
private/secrets Read You must have a GPG key to decrypt the keys
nodejs/node Write -
nodejs/deps¹ Write If you have write access to Node.js dependencies you can hide malicious code and publish a new version, eventually the automation will create a PR to sync to nodejs/core and this code might pass without supervision
nodejs/build (GH) - N\A
nodejs/node-core-utils Write User must have Write access to nodejs/node to open a attack vector
npm account Write Because you can change the node-core-utils/branch-diff code to inject malicious code
Jenkins CI - test - N\A
Jenkins CI - release - N\A
Infra - test ? Check if the CI runs with push permissions to Node.js
Infra - release - N\A
Build infra - N\A
Website Infra - N\A
Youtube - N\A
Zoom - N\A
1Password - N\A
Social media accounts - N\A
Email (nodejs-sec) - N\A
Email (io.js aliases) - N\A